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DECLARATORY RELIEF IN INSURANCE 
COVERAGE DISPUTES 
BY JOSEPH F. CUNNINGHAM 
I
n the fairly recent decision ofAl/state Insurance Co. 
v. Atwood,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland pro-
vided claimants, insurance carriers, and their attor-
neys guidance as to when a carrier might seek judicial 
interpretation of policy language related to the facts in the 
course of a policy coverage dispute. Indeed, some would 
suggest that this case posits the most precise guidelines for 
seeking such relief anywhere. The issue is a particularly 
topical one for reasons that will be discussed. Its resolution 
in Maryland contrasts sharply with the course taken by the 
highest courts of other states. Practitioners will find the 
court's decision by Judge Eldridge for a unanimous court 
both logical and persuasive. Interestingly enough, a con-
trasting Virginia decision, Reisen v. Aetna Lifo & Casualty 
CO.,2 if less scholarly, raises interesting policy questions 
which bear further thought. Other appellate courts are 
divided along lines set out in these two leading decisions and 
a review of both suggests the parameters of the topic. 
Atwood is the latest in a significant line of cases in 
Maryland dealing with the problem of the appropriate time 
for an insurance carrier to raise the issue of policy coverage 
in cases where an underlying dispute involving its insured 
suggests conduct facially outside the scope of the policy's 
terms and conditions. While this issue has been frequently 
presented to courts over the years, the increase in coverage 
litigation generally and the ingenuity of counsel for claimants 
and insureds seeking to fit claims within the ambit of policy 
coverage have significantly increased the pace of such deci-
sion-making by courts. This increase has forced develop-
ment of procedural ground rules covering the topic over the 
past twenty years. 
A landmark decision in this area, both in Maryland and 
nationally, is Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 3 
There, the court of appeals spoke definitively in a number of 
areas involving insurance policy rights and obligations. The 
decision indicated, infer alia, that a carrier owed its insured 
a complete legal defense to claims that suggest even a 
possibility of being covered under the four corners of policy 
language. The case further stands for the proposition that a 
conflict of interest between the carrier and its insured, once 
developed, 4 obligates the carrier to provide separate counsel 
of the insured's choosing to the insured at the carrier's 
expense. Finally, the Brohawn court held that an insurer 
ordinarily could not obtain a declaratory judgment concern-
ing policy coverage where the coverage issue to be deter-
mined was essentially the same as an issue to be decided in 
the pending tort case. Atwood, fifteen years later, then 
undertook to determine precisely when this type of early 
declaratory relief might be appropriate. This inquiry had 
some guiding precedent which arose in the wakeofBrohawn. 
For over a decade after Brohawn, there had been a series 
of decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that 
seemed to back away from its general prohibition of carriers 
seeking early declaratory relief in instances when they be-
lieved underlying disputes involving their insureds were 
outside the scope of policy coverage. Carriers persisted in 
seeking redress through declaratory judgment by fastening 
on language in Brohawn that, where policy coverage "ques-
tions are independent and separable from the claims asserted 
in a pending suit by an injured third-party,'os such claims 
could still be resolved by means of declaratory judgment. As 
the court in Atwood noted, a number of decisions were made 
in the interim which permitted anticipatory rulings on cover-
age before the underlying suit was tried. The Atwood court 
did not indicate, of course, the degree of confusion felt by 
many attorneys arising from the manner in which cases after 
Brohawn fudged the "independent and separable" standard 
to the point where it was often guesswork as to when a carrier 
might properly file suit to determine a coverage issue involv-
ing a pending case. 
The Atwood court cited Brohawn's reference to disputes 
between a carrier and its insured in determining whether the 
insured had given the insurer adequate notice of an underly-
ing claim to preserve policy rights and/or whethetthe insured 
had cooperated with the insurer in defending a claim or 
refused to pay premiums. Such issues are fit for a declara-
tory ruling prior to the trial of an underlying tort case. 
Conceptually, it makes sense for a court to initially resolve 
these kinds of questions because they involve, not interpre-
tation of policy coverage, but rather policy exclusions. 
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These questions relate to facts clearly "separable" from 
issues likely to arise in thir4-party claims against an insured. 
The harder questions of independence and separability re-
lated to coverage language in a policy were presented by the 
cases Northem Assurance Co. v. EDP Floors, 6 St. Paul Fire 
& Marine Insurance v. Prysesld,7 Truck Insurance Cycle v. 
Mark's Rentals,8 and Bankers & Ship Insurance v. Electro 
Enterprises.9 
In these related cases, it appeared that the clear line drawn 
by Brohawn had significantly blurred. This may have been 
due to the highest Maryland court's second thoughts with 
regard to whether the near-prohibition of prompt declaratory 
relief to carriers in cases involving seemingly obvious 
noncovered acts nonetheless obligated the carriers to provide 
their insureds a complete defense. The Atwood court, in a 
footnote, suggests that a look at St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance v. Prysesld cited previously will clarify which 
coverage issues are separate and which are not separate and 
independent from issues in pending tort suits.IO However, 
this clarity, as a studied review of Prysesld will show, is far 
from apparent. Indeed, Prysesld created more confusion 
than it eliminated for commentators and practitioners alike. 
The reason is simply that this case also seemed to suggest 
that, contrary to Brohawn, declaratory actions to determine 
the existence of policy coverage generally might lie prior to 
resolution of the underlying suit involving the insured. 
Atwood, like Brohawn, concerned a mixed bag of allega-
tions involving intentional and negligent wrongdoing. Thus, 
it permitted the court of appeals to voice the propriety of 
having the underlying litigation proceed before any coverage 
issues were resolved. At the same time, the Atwood court 
wisely alluded to the reality that clever attorneys for both 
plaintiffs and defendants in underlying suits, in an attempt to 
make possible the availability of insurance proceeds, were 
styling and accepting pleadings artfully coined as "negligent 
sexual molestation," "negligent rape," and "negligent sod-
omy." The court adverted to the risk of fraudulent pleading 
and tactics "in order to manipulate insurance coverage," 
where the particular parties' interests are best served only 
when "a jury return [ s] a verdict finding that even the most 
... blatant criminal and/or intentional acts [to be] negligent 
conduct. "11 Upon refusing to permit insurers to intervene in 
the underlying dispute as an obviously interested party, the 
court concluded such intervention would be mischievous by 
putting an insured to the defense of its position as to the 
plaintiff in the underlying case and also as to the insurer 
seeking to prove intentional wrongdoing. 12 The court further 
stated that permitting the carrier to intervene would run 
counter to the long-standing prohibition on direct action suits 
involving insurers before the liability of an insured is de-
cided.13 The court was also reluctant to permit the issue of 
insurance to be presented to a jury when the acknowledged 
prejudicial impact of such information had traditionally been 
excluded from jury consideration in Maryland.14 
4 The Law For u m 123.1 
Nonetheless, while emphasizing its dislike for pre-trial 
declaratory litigation by insurers, the court of appeals went 
on to spell out procedural rights for insurers challenging their 
obligation to pay judgments and related costs should its 
insureds not prevail in the primary case. It permitted insurers 
to subsequently litigate any coverage issue they chose, 
despite an adverse judgment against their insured. yet, it 
required that such suit be filed within ten days of the entry of 
judgment in the tort suit. IS 
The trial judge must then determine as a matter of law 
whether or not the issue resolved at the underlying trial to 
determine coverage was fairly litigated. If so, the second 
proceeding ends. If not, then the insurer must present 
evidence as to the absence of such fairness and, ostensibly, 
the circumstantial reality of whether or not policy coverage 
exists. It seems unclear as to why a two-step process is 
required here while a single hearing, preceded by briefing, 
should normally suffice to resolve the fairness issue. But the 
court, in permitting a trial judge to take an extended look at 
the coverage question, has permitted more. 
Regardless, the decision has an analytical consistency in 
dealing with a thorny problem which should provide fairness 
to both sides in this kind of increasingly frequent dispute. It 
will be interesting to observe the impact of such ruling on 
future insurance-related tort litigation, both with respect to 
volume and complexity. 
The Supreme Court of Virginia chose a different course 
a fewyears earlier in the previously mentioned case of Reisen 
v. Aetna Lifo & Casualty Co. Rejecting Brohawn and other 
similar decisions from foreign jurisdictions, the court simply 
concluded that the existing Virginia declaratory ju4gmentact 
allowed a carrier who could show the existence of a justi-
ciable controversy to promptly pursue disposition of such 
controversy before its insured's tort trial. Not persuaded by 
the Brohawn line of cases, but citing none to the contrary, the 
court instead relied upon general language from a 1941 tome 
by one of the draftsman of the Uniform Declaratory Judg-
ments Act.16 It then suggested that the carrier's acknowl-
edged duty of good faith owed to its insured, in responding to 
a plaintiff's settlement demand in the tort suit, clearly 
obligated it to resolve the coverage question promptly (a 
duty, no doubt, the insured would happily waive). While 
such rationalization may seem feeble, a reading of the case 
displays the sense that the court was outraged that "unscru-
pulous litigants" would disregard the facts and falsely allege 
claims to set up an insurer to assume policy obligations. The 
opinion seems to imply that common sense dictates no 
judicial dalliance with these preposterous "negligent rape" 
type pleadingsl7 and their prompt adjudication as a quick 
purgative for such mischief. 
However, before dismissing as overbroad the approach 
taken by the Supreme Court of Virginia, it is worth consid-
ering some policy reasons that favorably weigh on the side of 
the Reisen approach. First, the availability of prompt 
resolution of the coverage issue, as the court suggested, 
undoubtedly has a tempering impact on meritless pleadings 
and subsequent trial tactics in the insured's tort suit. Addi-
tionally, any inclination towards fraud implicit in "negligent 
rape" style pleading, in combination with lowering of public 
respect forthe judicial process and its potential subversion of 
which the Atwood court warned, is stymied. 
Rapid determination of policy coverage questions should 
also favor settlements in cases similar to Reisen where the 
court quickly establishes a lack of coverage and, thus, defines 
certain limits on a defendant's "deep pockets." This ap-
proach contrasts with the delayed adjudication approach of 
Atwood where a carrier, doubting coverage exists, will 
ordinarily not entertain any settlement proposals. An initial 
determination that a policy lacks coverage may well elimi-
nate a number of tort suits against defendants who are clearly 
uninsured for the wrongs claimed, thus arguably promoting 
judicial economy. 
Finally, perhaps an up-front ruling as to coverage pro-
vides an insured a degree of certainty as to its position at trial 
of the underlying dispute and the finality of a judgment in the 
dispute, which the Atwood approach denies. While the 
Reisen court never articulated these considerations, they 
clearly suggest themselves. 
Other courts have addressed, with varying degrees of 
sophistication, the timing of a declaratory judgment in the 
context of supposedly applicable exclusions under an insur-
ance policy. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Emery,IS the 
Court of Appeals of Florida may have provided the most 
recent and, perhaps, the most practical approach. There, the 
carrier appealed a lower court's decision denying its com-
plaint for declaratory relief as premature because no suit had 
yet been filed against the insured. The insurer contended that 
a "business pursuits" exclusion in its homeowner's policy 
applied and, therefore, terminated any duty to defend the 
insured against a third party in the prospective litigation 
growing out of a business related claim.19 The Emery court, 
upon review, fell in line with the letter and spirit of the holding 
of the Supreme Court ofVirginia in Reisen. Citing American 
Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson,20 the court wrote, 
"the better part of wisdom should have dictated . . . the 
resolution of the question of ... liability to the insured under 
the claimed renewal of the policy by the simple expedient of 
a declaratory judgment proceeding, at the inception of the 
litigation.'~1 The court ruled that the coverage issue was 
separate from the negligence issue in the threatened litigation 
and that the lower court erred in adjudging the petition 
"premature" despite the absence of an existing suit against 
its insured.22 
California, conversely, at least at the intermediate appel-
late level, seems to have flatly refused to allow an insurance 
company to maintain any declaratory j udgment action against 
an insured while the main action is still pending. In United 
Services Automobile Ass'n v. Martin,21 the insurer sought 
declaratory relief due to the insured's failure to cooperate, as 
required by the policy. In Maryland, Virginia and most other 
states, such preliminary action would clearly be permitted 
because resolution of the applicability of the cooperation 
clause is obviously a separate matter from any underlying 
litigation. In California, however, the lower court sustained 
a demurrer to the amended complaint seeking a declaratory 
judgment and dismissed the action. The insurer appealed. 
The Court of Appeals of California, upon review, ruled that 
a required showing of prejudice could not be made while the 
main tort action was pending, thus making its outcome 
uncertain. Consequently, declaratory relief against the in-
sured was inappropriate at that time.24 One can only ponder 
the fairness and wisdom of a judicial mandate that demands 
proof of prejudice as a pre-condition to a carrier even 
proceeding in such cases to seek declaratory relief.2S 
. Ohio also recently reviewed the propriety of an early 
declaratory judgment action in a case where an underlying 
dispute involving the insured with third-parties suggested 
conduct facially outside the scope of a policy's terms and 
conditions. In so doing, it has embraced the other pole of 
absolutism in dealing with this type of declaratory action. In 
Preferred Risk Insurance Co. v. Gill,26 the insurer sought a 
declaratory judgment that it did not have to defend or 
indemnify its insured in an unresolved, pending civil lawsuit 
arising out of a murder perpetrated by the insured. The lower 
court ruled in favor of the insurer that it had no duty to defend 
or indemnify the insured. However, the court of appeals 
reversed in part, ruling that the insurer must defend the 
insured when negligence is alleged because such negligence 
was covered. The insurer moved to certify the record. 
Pursuant to Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Taylor' and 
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pikiner,28 Ohio courts 
previously followed the rule that the duty to defend was not 
a proper subject for a declaratory judgment action.29 Never-
theless, upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio took the 
opportunity to reexamine the rule of law set forth in Taylor 
and, despite two judges dissenting, reversed the lower court's 
decision. Relying on Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Co. v. Hammer,30 and ignoring the more sweeping 
and more recent holding in Reisen, the court cited an "ethical 
dilemma" which an insurer supposedly faces in its duty to 
defend when the insured's own conduct arguably takes it 
outside the coverage of the policy. 31 The court then ruled that 
consistently permitting the insurer to bring preliminary de-
claratory judgment actions may eliminate this perceived 
ethical predicament by relieving the insurer of any duty to 
defend despite the potential coverage mandated by the plead-
ing.32 . 
Such emphasis on "ethical" concerns by the carrier 
seems misplaced at best. Surely the issue is simply one of 
contractual duty. The Ohio court has traveled from one pole 
to the other in a short period of time on the present topic and, 
at least in this last instance, simply used judicial fiat to open 
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the court room door to early resolution of coverage issues. 
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that divergent 
paths have been followed by the respective jurisdictions in 
dealing with the topic of litigation timing involving insur-
ance coverage questions. The comparative increase or 
decrease in pretrial suits by insurance carriers in the refer-
enced states may provide the ultimate answer as to the better 
course. Reflection on the "all or nothing" approach of the 
Ohio and California courts is interesting for its divergence, 
but hardly for the subtlety of the reasoning displayed by 
either. Conversely, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland in Atwood has provided sophisticated, albeit far 
from perfect guidelines for declaratory relief to carriers that, 
for fairness and analytical precision, other state courts might 
well consider. It surely can be said to be the leading case on 
the subject presently. 
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